The Al Shabaab Series: Lessons from the 14 Riverside Attack in Nairobi


Hello Delegates,

This post will be the first in a series of posts about the Al Qaeda linked terrorist organization, Al Shabaab. The series will explore how the group operates, organizes itself, and is able to persist within the Horn of Africa. While this series focuses on Al Shabaab, the insights and observations highlighted should be applied to terrorism in the Horn of Africa in general.

Over the winter break, I returned to my hometown of Nairobi, Kenya. During my last week there, the city underwent a terrorist attack orchestrated by Al Shabaab (you can read more about the group in our topic synopsis). The devastating assault left 21 dead. It reminded Kenyans as well as the wider East African community about the magnitude of the problem of terrorism within the region as well as the difficulty involved in curbing the issue. The attack illustrates how acts of terror are enacted by Al Shabaab within the Horn of Africa and some factors to consider when coming up with ways to effectively combat the group.

The Events of the Attack

14 Riverside is a luxury office complex in Westlands, one of the most popular neighbourhoods in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. At 3:48 PM on 15th January 2019, at least four assailants, later identified as members of Al Shabaab, stormed the office complex armed with AK-47s and grenades and opened fire. By 4:00 PM local authorities had arrived on the scene and began to rescue the 700+ people trapped in the complex. The assailants managed to hold their position within the complex for several hours through the capture of hostages as well as masking their identities with civilian clothing. At 10:30 am the next day, the president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta addressed the nation stating that the situation was contained. Since the attack, the Kenyan government has embarked on a fervent investigation to find individuals who participated in the planning, funding and executing the attack. As of January 28th, 2019 a total of 19 suspects had been indicted in the investigation.


The attack is one of many that Al Shabaab has enacted in Kenya in the last decade including the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and 2015 Garissa University assault. Al Shabaab claims that the attacks are retaliation for the continued intervention of the Kenya National Defense Forces in Somalia where the group is based. Despite the attacks, the Kenyan government has not withdrawn from the region and continues to make progress in combating the group.

Takeaways

  1. Illegal Arms Trade Facilitates Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: the modus operandi of Al Shabaab within these attacks has been rapid and sustained gunfire from sophisticated weapons such as AK-47s and Browning pistols. This is bolstered by explosive devices such as grenades. Instability and corruption within the Somalian government and the countries strategic coastal position create the impetus for a large scale, unperturbed illegal arms market which fuels Al Shabaab's destructive activities.
  2. Traditional Assumptions Collapse in the War on Terrorism: In war, there is usually a well-defined battlefield, known opponents wearing uniforms and established mechanisms for diplomacy and negotiation. All of those assumptions are null and void when it come to Al Shabaab. As seen at 14 Riverside, assailants are usually near indistinguishable from civilians. They wear the same clothes and often times the battle happens in mundane places such as malls, universities and office complexes. As such, traditional military approaches are rendered ineffective in the face of this type of adversary.
  3. The Importance of Intelligence: Following the 14 Riverside attack, Kenyan Interior Cabinet Secretary, Fred Matiang'i called for a new approach in the fight against Al Shabaab on Kenyan soil. He encouraged police commanders across the country to place higher emphasis on intelligence gathering as a means of combating terrorism. This is because, as stated in the previous point, the versatility and ambiguity of assailants make it hard to predict and identify potential attacks. As such, the sourcing and sharing of useful intelligence will be imperative in eradicating the problem of terrorism within the Horn of Africa. This will require increased investment in more sophisticated technical infrastructure as well as increased collaboration between countries in the region.
 You can read more about the 14 Riverside attack below:
 https://citizentv.co.ke/news/update-another-loud-explosion-heard-from-14-riverside-227014/
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/world/africa/nairobi-attack.html?module=inline
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/world/africa/nairobi-shabab-attack.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer


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