A Path to Peace: Reform in Ethiopia

Hey delegates! Today we're going to hone in a little bit on governmental leadership and state structure. In particular, we'll be looking at Ethiopia as an emerging force of stability within the Horn of Africa.

More than 80,000 people died in the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia border war is perhaps best known for bringing about massive consequences within just two decades. As the war spread, so did the gross displacement of communities. But in July of 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea formally declared an end to their state of war, the product of a two-decade-long standoff rooted in strained relations over a shared border. Many expect this official end of hostilities to bring some level of stability and peace to the Horn of Africa, a part of the world commonly regarded for its enduring conflicts and prominent trade routes. 

To understand this conflict—namely, the effects of its end on the Horn of Africa—we must first dig into a little background: Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990s. In spite of this, the nation never truly recorded the same growth as its neighbor and precursor, thus sinking into economic and social isolation. On the other hand, because Ethiopia became landlocked after Eritrea's secession, it has a strategic interest in a critical Eritrean port, Assab. As such, hostility was allowed to fester. The announcement of the end of the war last year followed after Ethiopia's prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, visited the capital of Eritrea, to meet with the Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. In the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the leaders said that the state of war has officially come to an end, and "a new era of peace and friendship has been opened." Ethiopia followed this visit by asking the visiting secretary general of the United Nations, António Guterres, to lift sanctions against Eritrea.

Much (but not all) of this newfound stability in the region can be attributed to new leadership within Ethiopia; the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, led by Mr. Abiy, has pushed for a series of changes within the country, one of which included decidedly changing Ethiopia's relationship with Eritrea. Under Mr. Abiy, the government also released political prisoners, gave amnesty to people charged with political crimes, and promised to partly privatize state-owned enterprises, including the national airline. When Mr. Abiy came into power, many onlookers referred to this as a regime change. In other words, Ethiopia approached a more open polity as opposed to a closed one. Mr. Abiy’s changes are a major departure for Ethiopia, which has long relied on a government model that resembles China's, emphasizing state-led economic growth and a suppression of political dissent.

So, how and why exactly did Ethiopia elect Mr. Abiy, especially when few expected the country to be met with such sweeping reforms? For one, Ethiopia's population is overwhelmingly young, with a median age of 18 and a thirst for economic and political freedom.

Another reason might be that a spiraling interethnic crisis desperately needed a leader whose platform aimed to broaden political participation to underprivileged groups. The devastation wrought by Eritrea-Ethiopia border war has since been replaced with the emergence of ethnic militias. Paramilitaries or ethnic militias known as special police, initially established as counterinsurgency units, are increasingly involved in ethnic conflicts, mainly between neighboring ethnic states. A good example is the role of the Somali Special Force in the border conflict with the Oromia state. Nearly one million Ethiopians have been displaced from their homes due to escalating ethnic violence since Mr. Abiy’s appointment.

Knowing all of this, you should start thinking about a couple of things: Considering the path to peace that Ethiopia and Eritrea chose to take, with what strategy can we approach similar conflicts within the Horn of Africa? What future problems does Ethiopia face, especially with respect to ethnic federalism? To what extent can the Security Council take action to ameliorate tensions before they escalate without infringing on the rights of the states?

Finally, what kind of effect do state actions have on terrorism and conflict? What kind of effect does terrorism and conflict have on state actions?