Fortifying State Actors in the Horn of Africa

Hello everyone! With only two weeks left until the conference, we hope you are all doing well with your preparations. This blog post will focus on our first topic, the Horn of Africa. We'll be diving into another case study with the goal of understanding how the weaknesses of states allow insurgent groups to operate within the gaps of political instability.

Let's look at Uganda as an example.

President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda is one of Africa’s longest-serving leaders. In December of 2017, the Parliament of Uganda voted to lift the age limit for presidents, setting the stage for Mr. Museveni to rule the country indefinitely. Musevini's supporters claim the law will end age discrimination in politics. Today, Musevini is in his fifth presidential term, which is set to expire in 2021. By then, he will be two years past the age limit set for presidents in Uganda's constitution written in 1995. While most members of Parliament overwhelmingly supported the law, most Ugandans opposed it. Lawmakers who have vocally expressed their disapproval have been attacked by unidentified perpetrators, raising the question of whether or not support from Parliament has been coerced. The police have also banned “illegal” public demonstrations against the law.

Many describe the process as the beginnings of a military coup. Joe Oloka-Onyango, a professor of constitutional law at Makerere University in Kampala, says “it’s absolutely illegitimate and illegal. It has been surrounded by violence and intimidation.”

Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Mr. Wine, is a ragga singer in Uganda who has rapidly turned into President Museveni’s most prominent political foe. He shocked Uganda's ruling party when he joined the political realm and won a seat in Parliament by a landslide in 2017. To get a picture of who exactly Mr. Wine is, Mr. Museveni has dismissed Mr. Wine as a weed-smoking “hooligan” from the “ghettos” of Kampala, where he was born and raised. Mr. Wine promptly embraced the designation and now calls himself the “ghetto president.” In turn, Mr. Wine has been severely beaten by unidentified perpetrators, believed to be hired by the government. He has also been charged on unfounded claims of treason and illegal possession of firearms.

Choosing to support or oppose Musevini as actors in the international community is more difficult than it looks. He came to power by helping overthrow two previous dictators, and has been credited with restoring some stability to the country, bringing economic growth and decreasing the prevalence of HIV. He also receives diplomatic, financial and military support from Washington in return for helping the United States fight militants in places like Somalia. Ultimately, however, Musevini maintains authority through repression and command over the army. Today, because nearly 80 percent of the population in Uganda is under age 30, many look to Mr. Wine as the popular choice, despite his lacking institutional support. The cornerstone of Mr. Wine's political career is fighting the effects of colonialism and repressive regimes, not just in Uganda but across Africa.

As Mr. Wine says, “It’s not going to be easy. They’re going to tear gas us. They’re going to whip us. They’re going to imprison some of us. And, yes, they will kill some of us.”

We look at Uganda today because we want the delegates of the Security Council to understand that the relationship between terrorism and state instability is more complicated than it appears. As the African Union gradually withdraws troops, handing over responsibilities to state governments, it's more important than ever that governments in the Horn remain a united front against terrorism. But what is the price that the international community pays for supporting leaders like Musevini, who have a history of offering unequivocal support against terrorism, even if they are violent and autocratic? What are the implications of vocally supporting Mr. Wine on an international platform?

On a slightly different note, democratization does not necessarily bring in its wake economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, and free markets. As demonstrated in the Horn, many states that hold elections, abide by written constitutions, and otherwise participate in so-called democratization are also victims of terrorism and widespread political frustration amongst the electorate. Even if all the conditions were met, waiting for habits like tolerance, mutual respect, fair play, and trust in public authorities to sink deep presupposes a very slow process of regime consolidation, which can take generations. What we encourage you to think about is how the Security Council, within its scope of powers, can do in the meantime. What is it about the Horn's sociopolitical environments that allow groups like Al-Shabaab to exist? Examine each case within the Horn of Africa, but also attempt to form a bigger picture about the region.

Please take a look at this article to see how groups like Al-Shabaab operate in the midst of elections.